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ABSTRACT. A rationalist and realist model of scientific revolutions will be con- 
structed by reference to two categories of criteria of theory-evaluation, denominated 
indicators of truth and of beauty. Whereas indicators of truth are formulated a priori and 
thus unite science in the pursuit of verisimilitude, aesthetic criteria are inductive 
constructs which lag behind the progression of theories in truthlikeness. Revolutions 
occur when the evaluative divergence between the two categories of criteria proves too 
wide to be recomposed or overlooked. This model of revolutions depends upon a 
substantial new treatment of aesthetic criteria in science with which much of the paper 
will therefore be occupied. 
1. TWO PROBLEMS OF RATIONALISM 
The  rationalist image of science has in recent  years been confronted 
by two seemingly unrelated challenges. The  greater  of these is the 
alluring thesis that scientific progress is fractured by revolutions into 
distinct epochs which adhere to forms of rationality peculiar to each 
and not shared by adjacent  periods. The  second, which has hitherto 
c o m m a n d e d  less attention, is the mounting realization that the 
deve lopment  of science is shaped part ly by factors which relate not to 
the verisimilitude or empirical  adequacy of theories but rather  to their 
aesthetic or formal features. Ei ther  of these tenets threatens the 
rationalist 's enterprise of explaining the evolution of science: if there 
is no paradigm-neutra l  canon of rationality it becomes  impossible to 
reconstruct  past science by reference to a unique or privileged set of 
norms of inference and assessment; if theory-preference  is further 
vitiated by the aesthetic predispositions of scientists, the resulting 
edifice appears  i rremediably contaminated  by irrationality. 
The  aim of the present  paper  is to dispel both these difficulties of 
rationalism by showing how the phenomena  of radical standard vari-  
ance and of theory-choice on aesthetic criteria are components  of the 
same, internally coherent  image of scientific progress.  The  result will 
be a rationalist model  of science which nonetheless allows the occur-  
rence of revolut ionary discontinuities in standards of theory-assess- 
ment  and reserves a distinctive role to beauty in the choice among 
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theories. The argument will investigate first the role of aesthetic 
standards in theory-appraisal and attribute their origin to an induction 
over past science; this treatment will in turn permit a new construal of 
scientific revolutions as ruptures in aesthetic canon. 1 
2. T H E  I N S U F F I C I E N C Y  O F  V E R I S I M I L I T U D E  
Realists prescribe that the ultimate goal of science is the construction 
of true explanatory theories about phenomena. The stipulation of 
explanatory power eliminates from the quest tabulations of mere 
logical theorems or phenomenic accidents and introduces a require- 
ment for theories to grasp the causal mechanisms which underlie 
reality. As in all search processes, in science it is valuable continually 
to review when and by which theories progress towards the ultimate 
end has been accomplished in order to perform the most judicious 
choices amongst competing theories and to maintain the adherence of 
the community to the current best theory. The scientist is, however, 
acting under the disadvantage of possessing no access to the causal 
mechanisms underlying phenomena except through the theories of 
which the appraisal is desired. It would therefore be specious to 
propose to establish by straightforward comparison with a putative 
'truth of the matter' whether a theory has fulfilled more closely than its 
rivals the final goal of true explanation of a given domain of reality. 
Faced by the unavailability of such immediate means of inspection, 
realists join antirealists in evaluating theories by less direct, diagnostic 
criteria. 
The members of one class of requirement to be considered 
significant in theory-assessment would by realists be denominated 
indicators of truth. These properties are taken by them to constitute 
an explication of the concept of verisimilitude: presence of these 
features in a given theory constitutes evidence for its proximity to the 
imaginary, perfect account. Five such indicators of truth, along with 
examples of their application in theory-appraisal, shall be outlined: the 
first two, self-consistency and consistency with extant theories, are 
logical requirements, while the remaining three, accuracy, predictive 
range, and fruitfulness, are empirical. 
1. Internal consistency: a theory should not harbour internal con- 
tradictions on pain of entailing every proposition of its language. Such 
a flaw was discerned in the Aristotelian theory of free fall, which 
asserted that heavier bodies fell faster than lighter ones: Galileo 
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envisaged a heavy body attached by a cord to a lighter one and asked 
how fast the resulting compound would be expected to fall. On one 
hand, the light body would retard the heavy one so the velocity of the 
composite should be less than that of the heavy body alone; on the 
other, the compound object is heavier that its heavy component mass 
and should consequently fall faster) 
2. Consistency with pre-existing well-corroborated theories: a 
theory under evaluation should not contradict other, entrenched and 
observationally successful theories, rather complement them or, if 
possible, provide deeper explanations of the generalizations which 
they express. The statistical mechanics of Clausius and Boltzmann was 
valued partly for its consistency with the predictively successful 
empirical laws of classical thermodynamics, and furthermore for 
deriving the equations of state of ideal gases - which in the earlier 
theory had the status of mere phenomenological generalizations - 
from the principles of conservation of energy and momentum. 
3. Predictive accuracy: deductions from the theory should agree 
with the results of observation and experiments. Newton rejected the 
Cartesian theory of vortices as the foundation of celestial mechanics 
because it was incapable of accommodating among its implications the 
known elliptical orbits of the planets. 
4. Predictive scope: the predictions of a theory should extend 
beyond the particular range of data that it was initially designed to 
explain. After nine years' investigations of the orbit of Mars, Kepler 
published his first two laws in the New Astronomy [ ] with Com- 
mentaries on the Motions of Mars: their empirical domain extends 
however (within the bounds of non-relativistic accuracy) far beyond 
the fourth planet of the solar system to all celestial satellites and 
indeed to all bodies in closed orbits under inverse-square law attrac- 
tive forces, as Newton's work was to establish. 
5. Fruitfulness: a theory should disclose new phenomena or pre- 
viously unnoted relationships between phenomena already known. In 
1873 Maxwell revealed unsuspected links underlying the formerly 
disjoint sciences of electricity, magnetism, and optics by integrating 
them into the united structure of electromagnetism. Physics since 
Einstein has striven further to enrich this theoretical network by 
searching for a unified field theory, an extension of general relativity 
to electromagnetic and nuclear forces. 
A theory is valued proportionally to the degree to which it exhibits 
such indicators of truth. Although they may be subject to differing 
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interpretations, their outline is not a matter  of current  controversy: 
these properties constitute science's standard means to judge of the 
truthlikeness or empirical adequacy of theories. 
The  question yet arises whether  these qualities are exhaustive of 
theoretical desiderata. Many prominent  scientists have answered this 
query in the tacit negative by prescribing quite other  requirements in 
their appraisal of theories: requisites of a certain aesthetic value. G. H. 
Hardy has, for instance, written: 3 
The mathematician's patterns, like the painter's or the poet's, must be beautiful; the 
ideas, like the colours or the words, must fit together in a harmonious way. Beauty is the 
first test: there is no permanent place in the world for ugly mathematics. 
P. A. M. Dirac stipulates for theories a similar aesthetic condition: 4 
It is more  impor tant  to have  beauty in one 's  equat ions  than  to have  them fit experiment .  
[ . . . ]  It seems that  if one is working from the point  of view of gett ing beauty in one 's  
equat ions,  and if one has  really a sound insight, one is on a sure line of progress.  
Lastly, Einstein was thus depicted by his son Hans Albert, himself a 
physicist: 5 
He had  a character  more  like that  of an artist than  of a scientist  as we usually think of 
them. For instance,  the highest  praise for a good theory or a good piece of work was not  
that  it was correct  nor  that  it was exact  but  that  it was beautiful.  
Similar words suggest that at least in the view of certain practising 
scientists, which any rational reconstruction of science has a prima 
facie obligation to accommodate ,  there is a second jury sitting over  
theories beside that of indicators of truth. This parallel tribunal 
evaluates theories by reference to requirements quite unlike those of 
predictive accuracy or scope: whereas indicators of truth are inter- 
preted as a token of theories'  truthlikeness, the second category of 
requirement  appears to those who apply it not to be correlated to such 
cognitive success but  instead to pertain entirely to internal, formal or 
aesthetic features of theories. That  the intuitions of scientists hold 
aesthetic features to constitute a class of evaluative criteria quite 
disjoint from that of indicators of truth is attested by, e.g., H. A. 
Lorentz in writing that "Einstein's  theory [of general relativity] has the 
very highest degree of aesthetic merit: every lover of the beautiful 
must wish it is to be t rue",  implicitly acknowledging that a theory may 
be beautiful and yet not true, or that it may fulfil one class of 
requirement  but not the other.  6 The  criteria distinct from but analo- 
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gous to indicators of truth which are employed by scientists for the 
aesthetic assessment of theories will in this treatment be dubbed 
'indicators of beauty'. 
A binary classification of evaluative criteria similar to that outlined 
here is endorsed in Einstein's view of the desiderata of theories 
according to which theory-comparision may be conducted on two 
levels: an external level appertaining to the relationship of the theory 
to experiment, and an internal one referring to its inner conceptual 
structure. Einstein summarizes the process of external appraisal by the 
remark that "the theory must not contradict empirical facts"; 7 but 
concurrence with experiment is not, according to him, a sufficient 
condition for the acceptability of a theory, for two reasons. First, it is 
always possible to eliminate discrepancies between theory and 
experiment by means of ad hoc hypotheses, which, though at times 
admirably satisfying the requirements of indicators of truth, reduce the 
scientific worth of the theory. 8 Second, modern physics witnesses an 
increasing length and complication of the chains of reasoning from the 
principles of a theory to its observational consequences, so that "the 
confrontation of the implications of theory by the facts becomes 
constantly more difficult and more drawn out"fl Internal evaluative 
criteria - akin to the present treatment's notion of 'indicators of 
beauty' - therefore become more influential as the complexity of 
theories increases. Einstein says these criteria bear upon the 'natural- 
ness' or 'logical simplicity' of concepts and of their interrelations 
which together constitute the basic principles of a theory. Such criteria 
are not so precise as to permit a quantitative comparison between the 
conceptual parameters of rival theories: Einstein particularly rejects 
numerical measures of logical simplicity because they require an 
arbitrary decision on what counts as a logically independent expres- 
sion. Rather, Einstein describes his internal criteria as involving "a 
kind of reciprocal weighing of incommensurable qualities". TM 
As the following sections will illustrate, the history of science teems 
with instances in which indicators of beauty appear to have prevailed 
over empirical criteria in directing theory-formulation. One episode 
occurred in the development of quantum mechanics from 1925, 
independently achieved by Heisenberg first and Schr6dinger soon 
afterwards. The story is best reported in the words of their junior 
colleague, Dirac: 11 
Heisenberg worked keeping close to the experimental evidence about spectra [. . .] .  
Schr6dinger worked from a more mathematical point of view, trying to find a beautiful 
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theory for describing atomic events [ . . .] .  He was able to extend De Broglie's ideas and 
to get a very beautiful equation, known as Schr6dinger's wave equation, for describing 
atomic processes. Schr6dinger got this equation by pure thought, looking for some 
beautiful generalization of De Broglie's ideas, and not by keeping close to the experi- 
mental development of the subject in the way Heisenberg did. 
Indicators of beauty are, for some scientists and philosophers, im- 
portant not only as illustrated above in theory-generation - a possibly 
arational activity - but also in fully rational theory-choice. For in- 
stance, indicators of truth would be instLfficient to adjudicate among 
two or more competing theories which exhibited the same indicators 
of truth under all possible evidence but possessed some incompatibility 
(e.g., radically different ontological commitments) which prevented 
their being considered alternative expressions of a common theoretical 
substructure. Such underdetermination would place realist science in 
the plight of the ass of Buridan, evoking two or more equally appeal- 
ing instantiations of science. 12 To shelter science from this danger, 
some, like R. Swinburne, have expressed the hope that indicators of 
beauty would succeed in breaking the impasse and identify one theory 
as preferable to the others on aesthetic grounds: 13 thus, in the event 
that rival theories appeared equally truthful, one should, like Paris, 
choose the most beautiful, for somehow that would hold the most 
promise. 
The above observations establish that distinctive and nontrivial 
roles are played in science by aesthetic concerns. Twentieth-century 
philosophy of science which from logical positivism to Lakatos has 
stressed empirical criteria of theory-choice has long resisted the in- 
troduction of indicators of beauty into rational reconstructions of past 
science: the following will endeavour to show how mistaken this 
neglect has beenJ  4 The balance may initially be redressed by a survey 
of indicators of beauty to complement that of indicators of truth 
offered above. 
3. AESTHETIC CRITERIA OF THEORY-CHOICE 
The indicators of beauty which shall be isolated and illustrated are the 
qualities of simplicity, symmetry, analogical interpretability, and con- 
sistency with metaphysical presuppositions. The two latter properties 
have not hitherto generally been classed as aesthetic criteria but the 
forthcoming discussion hopes to dehaonstrate their isomorphism with 
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the former  two desiderata of which the aesthetic nature is unques- 
tionable: in any event  the four qualities may jointly be taken as the 
extensional definition of beauty in science to which the present treat- 
ment  shall adhere, just as indicators of truth explicate what it is for a 
theory to be proximate to the truth. 
Three  suggestions will be supported by exemplification in this 
section: that indicators of beauty are logically distinct from indicators 
of truth in possessing no correlation to empirical success; that in the 
history of science there exist many instances of theory-choice which 
cannot  be explained without reference to these aesthetic criteria~ thus 
adducing grounds independent  of the subsequent discussion of 
scientific revolutions to postulate their operation; and last, that al- 
though the four indicators of beauty may be discerned in the scientific 
discussions of any epoch,  their content  is temporally variable so that 
theories once thought ugly may have subsequently won strong aes- 
thetic approbation and vice versa. 
1. Simplicity. The  simple has frequently been attributed a guiding 
aesthetic role in the history of science, but  perceived instantiations of 
the quality have radically changed in time. Copernicus relates at the 
'opening of his Comrnentariolus that he was disturbed to find in 
Ptolemaic astronomy such a cumbersome scheme of epicycles, equant 
points, and eccentric circles: ~5 
A system of this sort seemed neither sufficiently absolute nor sufficiently pleasing to 
the mind. [...] I often considered whether there could perhaps be found a more 
reasonable arrangement of circles [...]. The suggestion at length came to me how it 
could be solved with fewer and much simpler constructions than were formerly used. 
John Dal ton believed that chemical compounds assumed the 
numerically simplest combinations of their constituent elements: as a 
consequence he was led erroneously to attribute to water a formula 
which would today be expressed as H O  rather than n 2 0 . 1 6  Ernst  
Mach proposed for science a regulative principle of economy,  sugges- 
ting that "science [ . . . ]  may be regarded as a minimal problem, 
consisting of the completest  possible presentment  of facts with the 
least possible expenditure of thought". 17 He accordingly developed an 
interpretation of Newtonian mechanics shorn of Newton's own 
concepts  of absolute space and time, which he regarded as metaphy- 
sical constructs superfluous to the empirical content  of the theory; on 
the same grounds but  less progressively, he was one of the last 
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physicists of note to doubt the existence of atoms. Einstein was 
famously motivated by simplicity; when once commenting upon a 
discrepancy of as much as ten per cent between a measured gravita- 
tional deviation of light and the effect calculated from general rela- 
tivity, he weighed structural simplicity against any empirical deficiency 
of the theory:IS 
For the expert, this thing is not particularly important, because the main significance of 
the theory does not lie in the verification of little effects, but rather in the great 
simplification of the theoretical basis of physics as a whole. 
These observations show simplicity in science not to be susceptible to 
atemporal definition: Copernicus's faith in the primitive character of 
circular motion, Dalton's arithmetical simplifications, Mach's anti- 
metaphysical guillotine, and Einstein's desire to minimize theoretical 
postulates are quite different from one another. Even among contem- 
poraries there is no unique conception of simplicity, as exemplified by 
G. Holton: "Einstein and Planck debated strongly in 1914 whether the 
simplest physics is one that regards as basic accelerated motion (as 
Einstein had come to believe) or unaccelerated motion (as Planck 
insisted). ''19 Indeed, simplification in one respect often involves com- 
plication in another: the formulation and solution of problems involv- 
ing spherical symmetry are simplified by the use of spherical coor- 
dinates rather than rectangular, but the latter are intrinsically simpler 
than the former. As Lakatos concludes: "No doubt, simplicity can 
always be defined for any pair of theories T1 and T2 in such a way 
that the simplicity of T1 is greater than that of T2. ''2° Second, 
although it can be shown formally that application of Ockham's Razor 
leads to hypotheses which are more informative than those yielded by 
any alternative strategy, there is no reason - in the absence of 
independent belief in the simplicity of nature such as Leibniz's 'prin- 
ciple of least action' - why that policy should result in hypotheses that 
are true more often than would any other. 21 
2. Symmetry. This quality is not the symmetry of natural objects, 
like snowflakes or molecules, which relates to features of beauty 
perceived in nature, but is rather a symmetry of concepts. There are 
several historical instances of the impact on theory-generation of 
considerations of symmetry. Einstein's formulation of the theory of 
special relativity (or - as he named it in early correspondence - the 
'theory of invariants') was heavily motivated by the concerns for 
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symmetry evinced in the opening sentence of his 1905 paper: "It is 
known that Maxwell's electrodynamics [ . . . ]  leads to asymmetries 
which do not appear to be inherent in the phenomena. ''22 Again, 
following Planck's theory of black-body radiation in 1900, the idea 
gained currency that light exhibited corpuscular aspects: prompted by 
a yearning for theoretical symmetry which acquired experimental 
support only some four years later, Louis de Broglie suggested in i923 
that particles correspondingly possessed wave-properties, advancing a 
relation between the momentum of a particle and the wavelength of 
the associated undulation which exactly mirrored Planck's equation 
linking the energy of the light-wave to its frequency. Another tes- 
timony of the role of symmetry in theory-formulation is provided by 
H. G. Cassidy who for good measure lends an artistic overtone to the 
conception: 23 
While I was listening to a piano concerto, the idea suddenly occurred to me that it 
should be possible to prepare electron exchange polymers. I was at once certain that this 
was feasible, and I felt the fitness of the idea in complementing the already well-known 
proton exchange polymers. [ . . . ]  Once the symmetry of the relationship became ap- 
parent to me I experienced great pleasure and excitement. 
Like simplicity, theoretical symmetry cannot be viewed as susceptible 
of extratemporal definition, since both the conceptual elements to 
which scientists consider the postulation of symmetry to be applicable 
and the forms of symmetry which they regard as material will typically 
change in time; nor is symmetry diagnostic of observational success, 
unless in individual cases some justification is discovered for postulat- 
ing symmetry of nature. 
3. Analogical interpretability. The devices of metaphor and analogy 
are sources of aesthetic pleasure in science no less than in literary 
composition: through their means are erected scientific models, 
representations of one phenomenon by reference to another which 
permit inferences to be drawn across domain boundaries. N. R. 
Campbell is a classic source for the belief that models are indispen- 
sable to science: as M. B. Hesse writes, 24 
[Campbell] considers that we require to be intellectually satisfied by a theory if it is to be 
an explanation of phenomena, and this satisfaction implies that the theory has an 
intelligible interpretation in terms of a model, as well as having mere mathematical 
intelligibility and perhaps the formal characteristics of simplicity and economy. 
Satisfaction with a theory thus derives for Campbell from its analogi- 
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cal allusion to known phenomena: the kinetic theory of gases, for 
instance, exerts appeal through its associated corpuscular model. Such 
models were most consequentially employed in nineteenth-century 
theories of the ether; Lord Kelvin wrote: "I never satisfy myself until I 
can make a mechanical model of a thing. If I can make a mechanical 
model I can understand it. As long as I cannot make a mechanical 
model all the way through I cannot understand. ''25 These expressions 
suggest that Kelvin and Campbell looked to models as a source of 
quasi-aesthetic satisfaction quite distinct from predictive power. The 
aesthetic appeal of analogy is further illustrated by the development of 
quantum mechanics from 1913 to 1927, a period which witnessed the 
loss and recovery of visualizability. 26 In 1913 Bohr proposed a model 
of the atom which retained its conventional visualization as a minia- 
ture planetary system: the subsequent decade revealed an incapacity 
of this model to describe atoms more complex that the simplest, that 
of hydrogen. In 1925 Heisenberg originated a new version of quantum 
mechanics couched in a mathematical formalism uninterpreted by 
models and referring throughout to particles of an unvisualizable 
nature: the concept of electron had evolved from analogue of a 
minuscule billiard-ball to purely abstract entity. Heisenberg asserted 
that he found this formal approach congenial to his nonvisual mode of 
thought; Schr6dinger was on the contrary disappointed by the lack of 
visualization and in 1926-1927 created wave mechanics, a theory 
logically equivalent to Heisenberg's which however pictured sub- 
atomic particles as wave packets. Schr6dinger later described his 
reaction to Heisenberg's work: 27 
My theory was inspired by L. de Broglie [. . .]  and by short but incomplete remarks by 
A. Einstein [...]. No genetic relation whatever with Heisenberg is known to me. I knew 
of this theory, of course, but felt discouraged not to say repelled, by the methods of 
transcendental algebra, which appeared very difficult to me and by the lack of visu- 
alizability. 
Schr6dinger had restored analogical interpretability at least tem- 
porarily to quantum mechanics, in the process testifying to the aes- 
thetic appeal of such figurative devices. Interpretations of the quality 
of 'visualizability' have been as historically fickle as of the other 
indicators of beauty: an epoch's preferred source of models, like 
Kelvin's mechanistic devices, is frequently later dismissed as quite 
inappropriate, as in Schr6dinger's wave mechanics; indeed, models are 
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often contingently prompted by current technology, as exemplified by 
the images of the nervous system successively inspired by arrange- 
ments of pulleys and strings, hydraulic piping and telephone networks. 
In addition, susceptibility to analogical interpretation - no matter how 
heuristically valuable - is demonstrably uncorrelated with obser- 
vational success and is therefore correctly classed as an indicator of 
beauty rather than truth. 
4. Consistency with dominant metaphysical presuppositions. Few 
have interpreted this quality as aesthetic, yet it resembles the other 
indicators of beauty in being neither positively correlated to truth 
(since there is no empirical warrant for the metaphysics of an age) nor 
susceptible to atemporal definition (for philosophical commitments 
themselves vary in time); furthermore harmony between theory and 
preconception yields gratification of a prima facie aesthetic kind. 
There are many celebrated cases in which this criterion has been used 
to evaluate theories, often unfavourably. Leibniz contested Newton's 
theory of gravitation on the purely metaphysical grounds that it 
violated Cartesian corpuscularism in which space was a plenum of 
particles interacting solely by collision. A remarkably similar story is 
that of Planck's and Einstein's rejection of quantum physics. To 
deduce the equation which he had constructed to explain the spectrum 
of black-body radiation, Planck employed the notion alien to classical 
physics of the quantum of action. The quantum theory to which this 
hypothesis led soon demonstrated spectacular predictive success, 
growing more radical with the work of Einstein, Bohr, and Heisen- 
berg. Planck, an older and conservative scientist, was horrified by the 
departure which he had himself initiated, recognizing the predictive 
adequacy of quantum physics but refusing to accept as permanent its 
discreteness and indeterminism. Einstein's benevolence was longer- 
lived, but from 1927 he mounted an implacable resistance to its 
renunciation of causality, believing that any indeterministic descrip- 
tion of phenomena was essentially incomplete. Though recognizing in 
quantum mechanics a measure of aesthetic appeal, he insisted that this 
was achieved in virtue only of the fact that the theory constituted a 
limiting case of the future deterministic formulation which alone 
would capture the full beauty of physical theory: 28 
There  is no qloubt that  quan t um mechanics  has  seized hold of a beautiful  e lement  of 
truth,  and that  it will be a test  s tone for any future theoretical basis, in that  it mus t  be 
deducible as a limiting case f rom that  basis, jus t  as [ . . . ]  the rmodynamics  is deducible 
from classical mechanics .  
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His biographers agree that Einstein's rejection of indeterminism was 
essentially aesthetic: for him the harmony of the universe would be 
marred if, to use his own metaphor, God cast dice. The requirement 
stipulated thus by Leibniz or Einstein that theories should accord with 
certain current metaphysical presuppositions is clearly a historically 
variable desideratum since the metaphysics of a community itself 
evolves. Further, as long as metaphysical presuppositions gain no 
empirical corroboration - arguably a logical impossibility - there is no 
reason why adherence to a particular such presupposition should 
confer on theories any greater truthlikeness than would allegiance to 
another. 
Such have been certain of the aesthetic requirements prescribed of 
theories in the history of science. It would be arduous to explain the 
above episodes of theory-assessment on the basis of indicators of truth 
alone: by reference to aesthetic categories they are, on the contrary, 
readily reduced to sense. The complementary explanatory power of 
indicators of truth and of beauty suggests that it is hopeless to propose 
to reconstruct science in exclusive terms of verisimilitude as has 
hitherto been almost invariably attempted. On one count, therefore, 
the acknowledgment and application of indicators of beauty is posi- 
tively demanded for the accurate reconstruction of past science; on 
another, however, the splitting of criteria of theory-assessment into 
two independent categories causes problems of its own to theory- 
choice. These difficulties must next be engaged. 
4 .  T H E  I N D U C T I O N  T O  B E A U T Y  
The benefit which accrues from a double canon of appraisal of 
scientific theories is the opportunity that a narrower and more dis- 
criminating ideal may thereby be constructed of the object of 
research, if - as hopefully envisaged by those who would by this means 
defeat underdetermination - the two evaluations should stipulate 
complementary qualities of theories to be desirable. The disadvantage 
is conversely the danger of conflict arising between the canons if in 
instances of theory-choice their verdicts should diverge. In order to 
formulate unequivocal principles of choice among theories it is there- 
fore necessary to investigate similar discord and enunciate a pro- 
cedure for its recomposition. 
Such a conflict would be the effect of an imperfect correlation 
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between theory-choices founded on indicators of truth and those 
based on indicators of beauty. Conflicts would not occur if that 
correlation amounted to exact coincidence, or in other terms if in 
every potential case of theory-choice the two classes of indicators 
agreed upon which theory to recommend. It would be logically 
possible to ascribe such a coincidence to universal accident, but this 
assumption would appear unpalatably to construe the beauty of 
theories as miraculous. Furthermore, postulation of a similar accident 
could not be regarded as permitting either an epistemologically com- 
plete account of past instances of theory-succession or a secure 
algorithm for scientific progress; both these purposes would require a 
relation of nomological coincidence, whether deterministic or statisti- 
cal. Satisfactory understanding of a similar law-like correlation would 
in turn require a causal explanation of the positive association between 
truth and beauty, most prima facie plausibly by demonstrating how a 
theory's endowment of indicators of truth ensures its simultaneous 
possession of indicators of beauty. Any explanation to this effect (in 
itself difficult to envisage) would conflate the two categories by 
reducing indicators of beauty to a subset of indicators of truth, since if 
a theory lacked features of beauty it would tend also not to be true. 
Such a conflation would violate the intuition explored above that there 
exists in theory-evaluation a category of requirement other than 
indicators of truth. Approaches postulating either an accidental coin- 
cidence or a nomological correlation of truth and beauty thus appear 
equally problematic. 
Any other approach would by contrast deny a systematic correlation 
and therefore allow the occurrence of tensions or conflicts between 
indicators of truth and of beauty: the danger of overdetermination of 
theories by criteria of evaluation would then arise since the recom- 
mendations of theory-choice of one category would in general not 
coincide with those of the other. In this case completeness would 
again not be satisfied unless a procedure were disposed for conflict- 
resolution. Should choices among theories be decided invariably on 
indicators of truth? If so, what role is reserved in science for indicators 
of beauty, save perhaps that of bestowing - c h o i x  a c c o m p l i  - a 
gratuitous accolade on those theories which accidentally display 
beauty in addition to verisimilitude? Alternatively, may indicators of 
beauty on occasion overrule indicators of truth? If so, what reflection 
is thereby cast upon science's proclaimed single-minded quest for 
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truth? While it is enviable to unearth one philosopher's stone, to 
stumble across two is embarrassing indeed. 
These problems must be resolved for an exhaustive and harmonious 
view to emerge of the roles of indicators of truth and beauty in 
science. The solution to be enunciated hinges on the familiar dis- 
tinction between the doctrines of metarationalism and metainduc- 
tivism. According to the former, the norms of scientific methodology 
are formulated a priori by inference from the nature and goals of 
science: on this foundationalist account a methodological precept 
correctly inferred will remain forever valid. Metainductivism holds on 
the contrary that the norms of scientific methodology are developed 
and refined by an induction over those amongst all past proposed 
norms which have demonstrated the most fruitful applicability, so that 
the battery of norms to which a community adheres may evolve in 
response to a perceived inferiority of its performance relative to that 
of an alternative proposed battery. Epistemological theorists generally 
posit that the scientific community's complex of methodological norms 
has in toto either demonstrated past fixedness and thus endorsed 
metarationalism, or undergone evolution and therefore been ap- 
propriately modelled by metainductivism. There is, however, no 
reason why both these modes of method-construction should not 
operate simultaneously in science on separate categories of 
methodological norms. The thesis that shall be expounded is that 
whereas indicators of truth are formulated by inferences from first 
principles characteristic of metarationalism, indicators of beauty are 
constructed a posteriori by metainductivism. 
Metarationalism is clearly responsible for the genesis of indicators of 
truth because their inclusion among the desiderata of theories derives 
entirely from the a priori definition of the goal of science, the 
complete and true explanatory account of the universe. The require- 
ments of internal consistency or predictive accuracy are prized not 
because they have previously been witnessed to accompany verisi- 
militude but because they are the elements of an explication of that 
very concept: indicators of truth appear in other terms to provide not 
a mere ampliative connotation but rather an analytic definition of 
truthlikeness. 29 It remains of course possible for indicators of truth to 
be inductively learned by a scientific community but this is irrelevant 
to the a priori logical status of such criteria. 
While theories which today demonstrate internal consistency or 
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accord with certain observations will so do forever in virtue of the a 
priori status of indicators of truth, no-one presumes that indicators of 
beauty are similarly invariant: it is commonly acknowledged that the 
perception of a theory as in some sense beautiful may easily b e  
overturned, as occurred when the simplicity of Ptolemaic and Coper- 
nican circles was denied by Kepler or when Cartesian corpuscularism 
was repudiated by Newton. To account for such variability it is here 
claimed that a community selects its aesthetic canon at a certain date 
from amongst the aesthetic features of all past theories by weighting 
each feature proportionally to the degree of empirical success scored 
to that date by all the theories which have appeared to embody it. The 
community's aesthetic canon is then composed of the set of such 
mutually consistent features which have gained the greatest weighting. 
This is a clearly inductive procedure: as a theory demonstrates 
empirical success its aesthetic features will gain proportionate weight 
within the canon which is to serve in the evaluation of current 
theories, while conversely the aesthetic features of a theory which 
suffers a streak of empirical failures will win a progressively lesser 
weighting in theory-preference. A community thus formulates its 
indicators of beauty by an induction upon the aesthetic properties of 
those of its theories which exhibit to the greatest degree indicators of 
truth. A theory appears beautiful in the measure to which it recalls 
past successes scored by itself and theories formally or aesthetically 
similar to it: as these instances of success pale by retrospective 
comparison with the empirical attainments of more recent theories, so 
too fade their associated aesthetic features to be replaced by a fresh 
canon. A time-lag thus tendentially opens between empirical and 
aesthetic evaluations of theories since the latter are generated by 
induction over the former and therefore exhibit delayed response to 
any unexpected empirical success or failure of a theory: as a con- 
sequence of this lag aesthetic evaluations of theories will tend forever 
to appear conservative or retrograde by comparison to empirical 
evaluations. T. H. Huxley's aphorism about "the great tragedy of 
Science - the slaying of a beautiful hypothesis by an ugly fact - which 
is so constantly being enacted under the eyes of philosophers ''3° aptly 
describes the lag of aesthetic appreciation behind empirical assess- 
ment. The perceived beauty of a hypothesis is a function of the 
observational success of anteceding theories aesthetically similar to it; 
the novel fact appears as yet ugly because unassimilated within a 
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theory of which the aesthetic qualities have been sufficiently weighted 
by the community. In time the community's indicators of beauty will 
evolve to render the theory erected about the new fact a structure of 
sovereign beauty and the disproven hypothesis merely pass6. 
Considerable evidence for the attribution of indicators of beauty to 
metainductivism is provided by the observations of the previous 
section. In general, theories which maintained aesthetic cohtinuity 
with their successful predecessors have been pronounced beautiful 
while their competitors which lacerated that continuity have been 
initially condemned as ugly or displeasing, only for those judgements 
to be gradually reversed as the aesthetically innovative theory proved 
its superior possession of indicators of truth. This perceptibly holds for 
each of the four indicators of beauty. For instance, the heliocentric 
world view of Copernicus was identified as simple and hence beautiful 
by him and certain of his contemporaries by reference to the aesthetic 
canons of the previously successful Ptolemaic astronomy; Kepler's 
genuinely new astronomy was by Aristotelians and strict Copernicans 
alike seen as deeply ugly, permeated by imperfect ellipses and occult 
attractive forces. Similarly the conceptual sparseness of the theory of 
relativity in which Einstein delighted was a brand of simplicity learned 
from statistical thermodynamics and Machian mechanics, by both of 
which Einstein's aesthetic predispositions were avowedly nurtured. 3~ 
Symmetry betrays the same inductive nature: the proposal of de 
Broglie that particles may exhibit wave-like properties possessed the 
same symmetry of Maxwell's equations; to its outlook would have 
appeared alien and therefore aesthetically displeasing the postulation 
of broken symmetries as in recent gauge-field theories. The con- 
struction of analogies is an explicitly inductive procedure since one 
can model the new only in terms of the old, the atom as a miniature 
solar system, for instance: the canon which praises a certain class of 
model, like Kelvin's mechanical devices, as aesthetically valuable must 
necessarily have been developed no less inductively. The beauty of 
metaphysical acceptability constitutes an equally clear case: Leibniz's 
Cartesian opposition to Newtonian gravitation and Einstein's deter- 
ministic repudiation of quantum mechanics were the hostility of the 
old beauty to the ugly new. These episodes of theory-assessment are 
each explicable by the allegiance of scientists to inductive aesthetic 
canons. 
The present account of indicators of beauty is intended to resemble 
the Humean explanation of the origin of notions of cause: just as 
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Hume believed the inductive apprehension of causal links to be 
unsupportable by nomological data but a nonetheless ineluctable 
product of a driven mind, aesthetic canons in science boast no 
systematic relation to truth but spring from the psychological concerns 
of scientists. Neither Hume's account nor this concludes that notions 
thus formed are of no value: as causal links are a convenience of the 
Humean life, so indicators of beauty may here aid theory-construction 
and choice. It is, however, important to remember the contingent 
nature of concepts generated by Humean inductions and to avoid 
attributing to them any necessity. 
The queries which opened the present section have thus been 
answered. There are no nomological connections between truth and 
beauty, merely inductive associations continually updated by scientists 
in the light of the degree of success of past theories. With this view of 
the inductive genesis of aesthetic canons in science it becomes pos- 
sible to return to the other challenge to rationalist images of science 
proposed at the outset, the belief in discontinuities of rationality. 
5 .  R E V O L U T I O N  AS A E S T H E T I C  R U P T U R E  
The occurrence of revolutions in science has been acknowledged 
since the 1930s when G. Bachelard wrote of ruptures ~pistdmologiques 
and L. Fleck of the alternation of successive Denkstile. 32 In this 
tradition T. S. Kuhn views intellectual history as sectioned into periods 
of 'normal science' defined by paradigms separated from one another 
by instances of 'radical standard variance', or 'changes in the standards 
governing permissible problems, concepts, and explanations'. 33 Some 
difficulty has, however, been encountered since Kuhn's original 
statement in explicating in what this variance consists, or which 
specific categories of norms of scientific procedure are liable to such 
discontinuities. Kuhn has volunteered no adequate elucidation, on the 
contrary compounding the obscurity when in a subsequent work he 
professed the opinion that there exist five criteria for theory-evalua- 
tion which will be common to the proponents of all paradigms: the 
qualities of accuracy, consistency, breadth of scope, simplicity and 
fruitfulness. 34 As long as these criteria are reputed to possess trans- 
paradigmatic validity and no complementary class of paradigm-bound 
norm is identified, it remains unclear how radical standard variance 
could ever arise. Kuhn alleges that although the parties to a dispute 
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agree on the criteria of theory-evaluation, they may differ in the 
application or the relative weighting of such principles in certain 
cases: 35 but this is patently not a radical variance, merely an 
indefiniteness of standards. 
It is remarkable that Kuhn's list of values juxtaposes - in terms of 
the taxonomy developed above - four indicators of truth and one 
indicator of beauty, simplicity. Kuhn here conflates the two categories, 
perceiving no need to comment on the difference between the formal, 
aesthetic quality of simplicity, of which the content is so strongly 
dependent on historical juncture, and the substantive properties of 
internal consistency or predictive accuracy which are an explication of 
the notion of empirical success. 36 A view which uncouples indicators 
of beauty from indicators of truth can, on the contrary, both allow 
standard variance and maintain the permanence of criteria of truth- 
likeness, thereby imparting a measure of continuity to scientific 
rationality. On this view a revolution consists of a discontinuous 
change not in the criteria of theory-evaluation in their entirety but 
solely in the class of indicators of beauty endorsed by a community. 
The pre- and post-revolutionary states of a science will be united by 
their indicators of truth in consequence of the a priori formulation of 
the latter, but will be distinguished by their appeal to different sets of 
indicators of beauty. This interpretation of the notion of scientific 
revolution perfectly harmonizes with the example typically offered by 
Kuhn, the late seventeenth-century transition from the Cartesian 
visualization of gravity as susceptible of mechanistic explanation to its 
Newtonian conception as a primary attribute of mass and hence not 
further explicable: 37 this shift has in the previous section been con- 
strued as a change in the aesthetic canons of metaphysical ac- 
ceptability, a construal which explains Leibniz's continued opposition 
to the transition on traditional aesthetic grounds. 
A period of normal science is therefore one in which theory-choices 
based on indicators of truth and those founded on indicators of beauty 
coincide and hence there does not arise the dilemma of choosing 
between the aesthetic appeal of some theories and the observational 
success of others. The indicators of beauty then prevailing will have 
been constructed as explained above by induction over the aesthetic 
features of past theories which have enjoyed empirical success and are 
therefore reputed to possess great indicators of truth. The resolution 
of what Kuhn terms 'puzzles' will be achieved within these dominant 
aesthetic canons: as hinted above and increasingly acknowledged by 
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historians, the Copernican planetary model and the theory of special 
relativity were solutions to just such puzzles and so did not on this 
account constitute true revolutions. Normal science will thereby wit- 
ness a stability of theoretical morphogenesis and spawn a lineage of 
theories united by aesthetic resemblance; 'anomalies' will conversely 
accrue when problems are attributed solutions which prove impossible 
to couch within the reigning aesthetic conventions, i.e., when the 
induction to indicators of beauty fails to maintain pace with the 
progression of theories in truthlikeness and therefore canons of beauty 
begin to lag behind the truths of the hour. A revolution will pre- 
cipitate when evaluations of theories based on the indicators of beauty 
of the paradigm have so far deviated from simultaneous judgements 
founded on indicators of truth that it becomes impossible for scientists 
involved in theory-choice to recompose or overlook the conflicts. 
Theoretical morphogenesis then becomes unstable and controversial, 
and two factions will emerge. Conservative scientists will persist in 
adhering to the aesthetic norms characteristic of the paradigm in 
which they have intellectual investment and execute theory-choice 
under the guidance of its indicators of beauty, even though such a 
policy will generally cause them to pursue theories which are 
empirically less successful (i.e., display lesser indicators of truth) than 
their rivals. This is the faction joined by Leibniz against Newtonian 
mechanics, Mach against atomism, Planck and Einstein against quan- 
tum mechanics. The acts of similar factions illustrate Kuhn's and 
Lakatos's belief in opposition to Popper that scientists are not invari- 
ably hypercritical towards their own theories. Such behaviour will be 
dismissed as desperate resistance to innovation by the other, more 
progressive party of which the members will suspend and override the 
induction to indicators of beauty, repudiate the aesthetic canons of 
their erstwhile paradigm and conduct theory-choice on the exclusive 
basis of indicators of truth, a course which - relaxing the extra- 
empirical constraints on theory-construction - will permit them to 
adopt theories more empirically successful than those of their con- 
servative adversaries. The aesthetic features of these new theories will 
in time come to constitute the indicators of beauty of the nascent 
paradigm. An analogy is thereby suggested between aesthetic progress 
in science and in artistic endeavours like industrial design or architec- 
ture: as in the latter domains a technological innovation of sufficient 
moment will render suddenly inappropriate the aesthetic conventions 
peculiar to previous techniques and simultaneously define its own 
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canons of beauty, so empirical advance in science at times occasions a 
discontinuous exchange of aesthetic norms. 38 
This image of scientific revolution as iconoclasm reinterprets in an 
aesthetic key Kuhn's controversial view of revolutions as switches of 
Gestalt, explaining how J. H. Wheeler could aptly extend to contem- 
porary physics what Gertrude Stein said of modern art: "It  looks 
strange and it looks strange and it looks very strange; and then 
suddenly it doesn't look strange at all and you can't understand what 
made it look strange in the first place. ''39 By 'a strange look' one 
readily intends, in science as in art, a violation of the dominant 
aesthetic canons of a time; a work of art or a theory cease to look 
strange when they convert aesthetic incomprehension to consensus. 
On this construal of revolutions, however, the incompatibility between 
paradigms is wholly aesthetic and not epistemic, hence preserving the 
continuity of rationality. After the revolution, aesthetic constraints on 
theory-choice will tend to crystallize until fresh tensions and ultimately 
a further revolution supervene. Science periodically enters ruts 
defined by aesthetic canons: a revolution represents the rationally 
guided exchange of one rut for another. The hope that indicators of 
beauty will defeat the threat of underdetermination is incidentally 
revealed illusory: any decision on aesthetic grounds between empiri- 
cally equivalent theories will in general be perceived as valid only 
within the paradigm then current and cannot hence be considered 
definitive. 
Hereby is offered an explication of Kuhn's intuition that whereas in 
normal science there is widespread agreement within the community 
on what constitutes solutions to the problems in hand, during rev- 
olutionary crises there is no similar consensus among scientists over 
the principles of theory-choice that ought to be applied: while one 
faction confers privilege on indicators of truth, the other favours the 
indicators of beauty then current. This view does not, however, 
vindicate Kuhn's stronger claim that theories embedded in rival 
paradigms cannot be compared since, as he believes, there are no 
paradigm-neutral principles relative to which this comparison could be 
executed: the transparadigmatic continuity of science is assured by its 
indicators of truth, even despite the periodic failures to adhere to them 
by aesthetically conservative factions. It is therefore definitely untrue 
that "the normal-scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific 
revolution is not only incompatible but often actually incommensur- 
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able with that which has gone before": 4° scientists of all paradigms 
share the conception of verisimilitude defined by indicators of truth. 
Also rejected by this approach is Kuhn's view of revolutions as 
irreducibly irrational transitions for which there is no logic but only a 
psychology. On the contrary, a revolution is occasioned by the 
eminently rational decision by certain scientists to pursue indicators of 
truth in disregard of beauty; the conservative faction in a rev- 
olutionary ~transition is guilty of irrationality in adhering to aesthetic 
conventions which impose arbitrary extraneous constraints on theory- 
generation. It is philosophically considerably more appealing to con- 
ceive of new paradigms and therefore new directions in science as 
springing from acts of rational deliberation rather than, as does Kuhn's 
account, from alogical delusion. 
The manifold differences between the revolutions envisaged by 
Kuhn and those delineated here may thus be summarized by noting 
that while the former are non-rational (in being prompted by extra- 
cognitive concerns) and non-realist (because they erode the notion of 
objective truth), revolutions interpreted as changes in aesthetic canons 
are on the contrary rational in envisaging a continued allegiance to 
indicators of truth by the progressive factions, and realist in preserving 
verisimilitude as the goal of science. 
'Important repercussions at once arise for historiography. The 
.identification of revolutions with discontinuities in indicators of beauty 
vindicates Kuhn's warning that the reconstruction of instances of 
theory-choice in paradigms previous to our own is problematic, for we 
no longer acknowledge the indicators of beauty which defined those 
paradigms but rather have constructed our own aesthetic canons by 
induction over the developments in science to this day. For example, 
we cannot credit as justified Copernicus's predilection for the circle as 
the geometrical form of planetary orbits because we do not number his 
doctrine of Pythagorean simplicity among our current indicators of 
beauty; we dismiss as unwarranted Einstein's opposition to quantum 
mechanics because we no longer count determinism among our 
metaphysical commitments. Nonetheless the reconstruction of past 
theory-preference is not hereby rendered impossible, for we share the 
indicators~ of truth proper to Copernicus and Einstein no less than to 
their more progressive successors in view of science's extratemporal 
constitutive goal of truth. The chief task for the historian of scientific 
revolutions is therefore that of identifying the indicators of beauty of a 
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paradigm in pre-revolutionary times and of charting the theory- 
choices performed in accordance with those indicators which depres- 
sed the observational success of the theories of that paradigm and 
ultimately led to its demise. 
Kuhn's imagery strongly evoked analogies between revolution in 
science and in society: 41 like social formations, theories succeed one 
another often not by gradual transition but by discontinuous sub- 
stitution. The interpretation of scientific revolutions as fractures in 
inductively-constructed aesthetic canons enables the isomorphism to 
be deepened with the Marxist theory of economic revolution. That 
theory locates the driving force of social progress in technical 
developments within an economic substructure which engenders, 
consolidates, is gradually hampered by, and ultimately overthrows and 
replaces a superstructure composed of relations of production and 
other ideological baggage. One may, in science, analogously conceive 
empirical progress constituted by increased theoretical verisimilitude 
as the substructural motor which accommodates successive super- 
structures consisting of aesthetic canons. As empirical progress is 
achieved, the prevailing indicators of beauty will be first strengthened, 
later undermined and ultimately destroyed by rising tensions between 
them and indicators of truth. The periodic overthrow of successive 
indicators of beauty is due to the fact that immediately upon for- 
mulation they switch to a conservative evaluative tack and in time 
inevitably begin to hamper scientific progress, exactly as state in- 
stitutions once erected crystallize a fleeting order and thus tend to 
hinder continued social evolution. History of science consists essen- 
tially of the growth of truthlikeness or empirical success, and aesthetic 
canons rise or fall as they facilitate or impede that growth. 
Thus are met the two challenges to the rationalist image of science 
which were adumbrated at the outset and of which the close con- 
nections have by now been made clear. There exists no nomological 
correlation between indicators of truth and of beauty, so conflicts may 
indeed arise between them, albeit minimized by the inductive asso- 
ciations which are erected between truth and beauty by scientists. 
Epochs of normal science are defined by the temporary success of 
such correlations while revolutions are presaged by their breakdown. 
The construal of scientific revolutions as the discontinuous exchange 
of one set of indicators of beauty for another permits the history of 
science to be unified in its pursuit of verisimilitude whilst nonetheless 
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undergoing variance in norms of theory-choice: hence revolutions do 
not necessarily jeopardize the rationality of science. Simultaneously 
the capacity of revolutions to displace outdated indicators of beauty 
guarantees that theory-choice will not permanently be diverted from 
objectivist, truth-seeking criteria by mere aesthetic appeal: the ap- 
proach of a revolution will relieve scientists of the requirement of 
allegiance to past indicators of beauty. Although indicators of beauty 
therefore occupy an autonomous role in theory-choice and may over- 
rule indicators of truth in the eyes of conservative scientists in rev- 
olutionary times, progressive science nonetheless maintains its quest 
for verisimilitude. Rationalism thus weathers the twin challenge of 
radical standard variance and of theory-choice on aesthetic criteria if 
these are viewed as two strands of the same model of scientific 
progress. 
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